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INTRODUCTION

The imminent rise of global electronic commerce carries with it important
implications for the development of trademark usage. A close connection between
trademark law and the growth ofelectronic commerce already has become apparent
to those that watch the development of "cyberlaw." Recent months have yielded an
explosion of Internet-related litigation arising out of trademark disputes.' These
disputes have come as a surprise to lawyers and commentators that follow the
emerging law of the Internet. Two or three years ago we might have confidently
predicted that copyright would be the major intellectual property issue in electronic
commerce.2 The early proliferation of trademark disputes, rather than copyright
disputes, was therefore somewhat unexpected. We are currently watching firms
enter the "cyberspace" market. The nature of the medium dictates that business

reputation and identity will comprise two of the key legal issues in the rise of
electronic commerce.
In turn, this strongly implies that trademarks, as a primary source of legally
recognized business reputation, will assume new importance in electronic
commerce. This Article discusses the legal framework by which existing trademark
doctrines may be applied to online business usage. Part II of the Article outlines the
structure of online business that will make trademark usage a central, if not the
central, intellectual property issue in electronic commerce. Part III discusses online
trademark usage under the law of the United States, with particular emphasis on the
1. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Quality Solutions, Inc. v.
Zupanc, 1997 WL 835481 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Academy ofMotion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 1997 WL 810472 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. EPIX, Inc. 983
F. Supp. 1331 (D. Or. 1997); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949
(C.D. Cal. 1997); American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997);
GreenProds. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co., 1997 WL 836372 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Desknet Sys. Inc. v.
Desknet Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1954 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 965 F. Supp.
17 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407
(C.D. Cal. 1997); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997);
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at * I (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
1997); Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo
Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1996); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Il. 1996); Panavision Int'l, L.P.
v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Hasbro Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group Ltd., 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616
(C.D. Cal. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996); Toys "R"
Us Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
2. For example, the 1994 Draft Report, or "Green Paper" from the Commerce Department's
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, devotes nearly 85 pages to the discussion of copyright
law on the Internet, but touches on trademarks for barely five pages. See THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INFORMATION INFRASTUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRAsTRUCuRE (1994).
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adaptation of traditional concurrent usage doctrines to a networked environment.
Because that networked environment is potentially global in scope, Part IV
examines how United States trademark law will function in an international setting.
The conclusion presents some modest recommendations for better accommodating
current trademark law to usage in global electronic commerce.
In this discussion, I take as my fundamental assumption a thesis that I have
advanced before: the sky is not falling with respect to cyberlaw.3 Current law can
be and will be applied to Internet activity, and will particularly be applied to
electronic commerce. For the most part, such application of familiar legal principles
will yield predictable and coherent results with which most interested parties can
live.4 In the rare circumstances where the Internet displays a truly new or unique
characteristic, current law can be fairly readily adapted to yield predictable,
coherent, and livable results. Such changes will likely be incremental, rather than
sweeping, and will be implemented via existing legal institutions rather than via
radically new structures of governance.
II. TRADEMARKS AND DIGITAL GOODS
It may be necessary at the outset of the discussion to dispose of the online
trademark issue most familiar to Internet watchers: domain names. I do not
propose to discuss them in any detail, partly because the matter has been thoroughly
discussed elsewhere,5 but also because the topic is peripheral to the analysis in this

3. See Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A FirstLook at the EmergingLaw of
Cybermarks, 1 RICH J.L. & TECH. 1 (Apr. 10, 1995) <http://www.urich.edu/-jolt/vlil/burk.html>
(applying trademark law to Internet domain names).
4. Cf. I. Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 993,
1000 (1994) (noting that many cyberspace issues will not be materially different from previous issues
in physical space).
5. See, e.g., G. Peter Albert, Jr., Right on the Mark: Defining the Nexus Between Trademarks
andlnternetDomainNames, 15 J.MARsHALLJ. CoMPuEtE&INFo. L. 277 (1997); G.AndrewBarger,
Cybermarks: A ProposedHierarchicalModelingSystem ofRegistrationandInternetArchitecture
for Domain Names, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 623 (1996); Burk, supra note 3; Neal J. Friedman &
Kevin Siebert, The Name is NotAlways the Same, 20 SEATTLEU. L. REV. 631 (1997); Michael B.
Landau, ProblemsArisingOut of the Use of "WWW. Trademark.Con ": The Application ofPrinciples
of TrademarkLaw to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455 (1997); David J.
Loundy,A Primeron TrademarkLaw andInternetAddresses, 15 J.MARSHALL J. COMPuTER& INFO.
L. 465 (1997); David W. Maher, TrademarkLaw on the Internet-Will It Scale? The Challenge to
Develop InternationalTrademarkLaw, 16 L MARSHALL J. COMPtrER & INFO. L. 3 (1997); Carl
Oppedahl, Analysis and Suggestions RegardingNSI Domain Name Trademark Dispute Policy, 7
FoRDHAm INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &ENT. L.J. 73 (1996); Carl Oppedahl, Remedies in DomainName
Lawsuits: How isaDomainNameLikea Cow?, 15 J.MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER&INFO. L. 437(1997);

Gayle Weiswasser, DomainNames, the Internet,and Trademarks: Infringement in Cyberspace, 13
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 137 (1997); Scott N. Barker, Note, Famous.com:
Applying theFTDA to InternetDomainNames, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 265 (1997); Kenneth Sutherlin
Dueker, Note, TrademarkLaw Lost in Cyberspace: TrademarkProtectionfor Internet Addresses, 9
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483 (1996); Deborah Howitt, Note, War.com: Why the Battles over Domain
Names Will Never Cease, 19 HASTINGS COMM. &ENT. L.J. 719 (1997); Joan Meadows, Comment,
Published by Scholar Commons, 1998
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Article. As mentioned above, the Internet has experienced a recent explosion of
trademark disputes. The majority of these disputes involve domain names, the
mnemonic nicknames that designate particular Internet Protocol addresses on a
network. Much of the furor revolves around the fact that such mnemonics can serve
both as resource addresses and resource names. Yet there is little question that such
Internet addresses, when associated with product or service names, can be valid
trademarks. I have already argued at some length that this combination of attributes
is by no means unique to domain names, and that current trademark law is capable
of accommodating Internet addresses much as it has previously accommodated
physical addresses, telephone numbers, and similar location designators.6 Thus, to
the extentthatthe domainname controversy has relevance to the present discussion,
it is only relevant as an early example of some issues that will recur as trademarks
become more widely employed in electronic commerce. Indeed, too much focus on
the peculiarities of domain name disputes could threaten to distort the development
of trademark law on the Internet. Therefore, core trademark issues will be the focus
of this Article.
There is an additional reason why domain names will receive little attention in
this Article, a reason related to their dual role as both resource locators and resource
identifiers.7 I have high hopes that the disputes over their usage will be short-lived.
Domain names presently derive much of their value from the combination of free
advertising and entry point into the confusion of resources on the Web that they
provide. However, such mnemonic locators will likely lose much of their value as
access to online resources becomes increasingly transparent to the user. Internet
users already have available to them avariety ofsearch engines that locate resources
via key-word searches;' these are expected to become increasingly powerful,

TrademarkProtectionfor Trademarks Used as Internet Domain Names, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 1323
(1997); James West Marcovitz, Note, ronald@mcdonalds.com-"Owninga Bitchin" Corporate
Trademarkas an InternetAddress-Infringement?, 17 CARDOzo L. REv. 85 (1995); David B. Nash,
Comment, OrderlyExpansion ofthe InternationalTop-LevelDomains: ConcurrentTrademarkUsers
Need a Way Out of the Internet TrademarkQuagmire, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 521
(1997); Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: PropertyRights and
PersonalJurisdictionover Squatters,Poachersand OtherParasites,58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 911 (1997);
Daniel R. Pote, Note, A Domain by Any Other Name: The FederalTrademarkDilutionAct of 1995
Applied to InternetDomainNames, 37 JUrIMETICS J. 301 (1997); Stacy B. Sterling, Comment New
Age Bandits in Cyberspace: DomainNames HeldHostage on the Internet, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 733
(1997); Carrie Weinfeld, Comment, Carrie@,onulrev.onu.edu: Internet Domain Names and

TrademarkInfringement,23 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 229 (1996).
6. See Burk, supranote 3,%34-59.
7. Domain names act functionally as locators or "addresses" to enable computers to find certain
files or resources on the Internet. See Burk, supra note 3, 30. They may also act as identifiers or
"names" to distinguish a particular file or resource. Id. It is in the latter capacity, as "names" and not
as "addresses," that they may function as trademarks. Id. 33.
8. Popular web-based search engine services include Infoseek, Weberawler, and Lycos. See ED
KROL&PAULAFERGUSON, THE WHOLEINTERNETFORWVINDOWS 95: UsER's GUIDE& CATALOG 127,
146 (1995). Other utilities such as Wide Areas Information Service (WAIS) and Archie allow searches
of database text or file names, respectively. Id. at 261-83, 345-70.
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accessible, and user-friendly.9 The advent of software agents that can be either
directly or genetically programmed to search according to the owner's preferences
should further diminish the importance of mnemonic URLs as entry points to the
net.'0 When domain names lose their value as mnemonics, then much of the furor
over their ownership should subside. However, the broader trademark issues they
raise will continue because ofthe nature of electronic commerce and the necessity
of trademarks.
.4.

Goodwill andReputation

A trademark may consist of a word, phrase, logo, pattern, color, design, or other
type of device that functions as an indicator of the source of goods or services."
Even sounds may become trademarks if they function as source indicators. 2
Trademark rights accrue as the mark is used in commerce and consumers identify
the mark with a certain source of goods or services. 3 In the context of electronic
commerce, such visual or audible signals will continue to serve as indicators of

source, much as they have in physical commerce. Additionally, some new indicators
of source, such as digital signatures or other cryptographic fingerprints, may begin
to serve in the capacity of at least some trademark functions.

1.

Signaling

The primary stated purpose for legal recognition of trademark rights is to
prevent consumer confusion. Either through personal experience, advertising, or
word of mouth, consumers come to associate a known mark with goods or services
from a particular source. Consumers then use the mark as a signal of the quality of
goods, expecting that goods branded with the mark will be of the quality they have
come to associate with past purchases bearing the mark." Use of confusingly

9. E.g., Marti A. Hearst, Interfacesfor Searching the Web, Sci. AM., Mar. 1997, at 68
(describing the next generation of information retrieval interfaces); Clifford Lynch, Searching the
Internet,Sci. AM., Mar. 1997, at 52 (describing the next generation of web search engines).
10. See Pattie Maes, IntelligentSoftware,Scf AM., Sept. 1995, at 84 (describing the development
of software agents via genetic algorithms).
11. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, McCARThRY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETION § 3:1,
at 3-2 (4th ed. 1997).
12. Id. § 7:104, at 7-243. For that matter, scents may be trademarks. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990). However, home computers are not yet equipped with odor generating
capability.
13. See 1 McCARTHY, supranote 11, § 3:3, at 3-5.
14. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (stating that
the "general concern [of unfair competition] is with protecting consumers from confusion as to
source"); see also Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir. 1959)
(holding that plaintiff has no remedy for trademark infringement until there is a likelihood of
confusion).
15. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, TrademarkLaw: An Economic Perspective,
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similar marks on competing goods may cause consumers to mistakenly purchase
goods from another source whose quality may differ from the goods the consumer
intended to purchase. Such mistaken purchases may occur through negligent use of
a similar mark or through intentional deception. Thus, in the absence of trademark
rights, unscrupulous competitors could take advantage of the association between
mark and quality
in order to "pass off" their own goods as those known to
6
consumers.'
Recognition of trademark rights may concomitantly protect the business
reputation of merchants.' 7 If consumers are deceived into purchasing inferior
products by a confusingly similar mark, they may naturally associate those products
with the source indicated by the mark. Consumers may be surprised or disappointed
by such inferior quality and develop an unwarranted negative impression of the
mark owner's products or services. This damages the reputation and goodwill of the
mark owner, potentially causing both a loss of future business and a loss of the
investment that the mark holder has made in developing recognition of the mark.
2. Business Incentives
In addition to its consumer and business reputation protection function,
trademark law may also serve to enhance the quality of goods and services offered
in the marketplace.'" This occurs because protection of distinctive trademarks
serves to protect investments in business reputation and goodwill.' 9 As businesses
invest in the quality oftheir products or services, that level of quality is associated
by consumers with the identifying mark ofthe particular business." Businesses will
be prompted to make such investments, knowing that the identifying mark cannot
be appropriated by companies offering cheaper substitute goods. Were trademarks
not protected, competitors might be tempted to "free ride" off of the goodwill and
recognition associated with the initial user of the mark.2' Competitors of the mark's
owner could sell inferior substitute goods under the same or similar mark, and
because the inferior substitutes could be more cheaply made, they could be offered
at a price lower than the initial mark user's goods. This could force the initial user
to lower his price in order to compete, a cost reduction that could likely only be

30 J.L. &ECON. 265, 275 (1987) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Trademark Law]. See generally I
MCCARTHY, supranote 11, § 2:3, at 2-3 (discussing the economic functions of trademarks).
16. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 2:3, at 2-3; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of TrademarkLaw, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 272 (1988) [hereinafter Landes & Posner,

Economics].
17. See 1 MCCARTHY, supranote 11, § 2:15, at 2-34 to -35 (noting that trademark litigation
protects goodwill as well as the symbol).
18. See Landes & Posner, TrademarkLaw, supra note 15, at 269.
19. See 1 MCCARTHY, supranote 11, § 2:30, at 2-53.
20. Landes & Posner, Economics, supra note 16, at 271.
21. See 1 McCARTHY, supranote 11, § 2:30, at 2-54.
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accomplished by also using inferior quality goods.' Then, competitors could
undercut the new price, and a downward spiral toward the poorest viable quality
would ensue. Such a race to the bottom is forestalled by protecting the initial users'
investments as signaled by their trademarks.
3. ProductInformation
The importance of trademark protection will vary depending on the type of
branded goods or services at issue. Economists divide goods into three classes based
on the manner in which consumers acquire information about the goods.'
Consumers can assess the first class of goods, called "inspection goods," for quality
and value by observation; for example, with goods such as fresh fruit, consumers
can determine their quality and value simply by inspecting them. 24 Contrarily,
consumers cannot assess the second class of goods, called "experience goods,"
simply by observation.' Experience goods only yield information about their
qualities over time. Like a new automobile, the latent defects or performance
advantages ofthe good become apparent only after the consumer has lived with the
good for some time.26
This issue of hidden quality becomes far more pronounced with the third type
of goods, called "reliance" or "credence goods."27 This type of good will neveryield
its secrets to the consumer, either via inspection or experience.28 Consumers either
lack access to information about the good or lack the expertise to evaluate the
available information. Instead, consumers must rely on the assessment of some
trusted third party, usually an expert, whose expertise allows the expert to assess the
good on the consumers' behalf. In an increasingly complex, technical society, large
portions of available goods and services-everything from medical advice to
computer hardware-will tend to fall into this category.
Consumers rely on trademarks as signals of quality, depending upon the type
of goods to which the marks are affixed.29 Trademarks tend to be least important in
the case of inspection goods, because the consumer can determine the quality of the
goods directly, without reliance on the mark's signal. Conversely, trademarks tend
to be most important in the case of inspection goods, because the consumer is
unable to assess the quality of the goods himself, and may rely on the reputation

22. See Landes & Posner, Economics, supra note 16, at 271-72.
23. ,VILLIAMM. LANDEs &RiCHARIA. POSNER, THEECONOMIC STRUCURE OF TORTLAW 284

(1987).
24. Id.
25. Id.; see Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J.POL. ECON. 311 (1970).
26. See Michael R. Darby &Edi Karni, FreeCompetition andthe OptimalAmount ofFraud,16
J.L. &EcON. 67, 68-69 (1973).
27. Id.; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 284.
28. LANDES & POSNER, supranote 23, at 284-85; Darby & Kami, supra note 26, at 69.

29. See Tom W. Bell, VirtualTrade Dress: A Very RealProblem,56 MD. L. REV. 384,406-08
(1997).
Published by Scholar Commons, 1998
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embodied in the mark. This may also be true of experience goods, because reliance
on the mark may save the consumer the time required to test the goods for quality. 0
In essence, the mark encapsulates the past experience of the consumer or other
consumers, becoming a sort of "expert" signal on which the consumer relies.
B. Electronic Commerce
The roles played by trademarks in traditional commerce indicate the desirability
of facilitating trademark protection in the electronic marketplace. Trademark
protection can be expected to facilitate consumer recognition, embody business
goodwill, and prompt product quality online as well as off.However, the degree to
which trademark protection succeeds in these roles depends to some extent on both
the nature of the electronic marketplace and the types of goods and services
exchanged in electronic commerce.
1.

Physical Goods

The reputational functions of trademark law will be of critical importance to
online commerce. Internet commerce appears to be developing into two general
categories oftransactions.3 ' The first category involves selecting, ordering, and even
paying for physical goods via the Internet. 2 However, goods ordered in this manner
will be delivered in a conventional way, such as by parcel post. This type of
commerce essentially uses the Internet as a sophisticated form of mail-order catalog.
Likewise, this type of commerce entails many of the same legal and practical
problems as mail-order catalogs. The second category of Internet commerce
involves traffic in digitized goods such as music, data, software, and movies.33 For
these kinds of informational goods, selection, ordering, payment, and delivery of the
goods can all take place online. Accordingly, this latter type of commerce raises
new and difficult legal questions.
Trademarks will be important to the first type of Internet commerce much as
they are to current mail-order businesses. Names or symbols embodying a firm's
goodwill and reputation will be relied upon by consumers because the consumer
will be unable to directly examine the goods until they arrive. While the consumer
can return defective or otherwise unacceptable goods, the time and effort required
to do so represents an extra cost to the consumer. If consumer fraud or abuse occurs,
the physical trail made during shipping can be used to trace the goods to their

30. Id. at 407.
31. See A. Michael Froomkin, FloodControlon the InformationOcean: LivingwithAnonymity,
DigitalCash, andDistributedDatabases,15 J.L. & CoM. 395,449-50 (1996).
32. Id. at 450.
33. Id.; see also Dan L. Burk, The Marketfor Digital Piracy,in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE:
INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 205, 207 (Brian Kahin &

Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (discussing emerging commerce in digitized goods).
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source. However, this also represents an extra cost to the consumer and may not
result in a consumer chargeback or refund. 4 Because the Internet can seamlessly
put the consumer in contact with businesses almost anywhere in the world,
consumer reliance upon firm reputation will be heightened. Locating and resolving
disputes with businesses in distantjurisdictions may be especially time consuming;
consequently, online shoppers are likely to deal with businesses that they trust will
not involve them in such lost-opportunity expenditures.
2. DigitizedGoods
Trademarks will be an even more important legal and business mechanism to
the second type of Internet commerce, traffic in digital or informational goods.
Consider the case of software, for example. Few consumers are likely to have the
personal expertise required to assess more than the interface of a new web browser
or HTML editor. They are even less likely to possess the knowledge required to
assess products with which they do not directly interact, such as operating systems,
hard disk optimizers, or cryptographic software. This lack of knowledge places
those goods inthe class of credence goods, goods for which the consumer must rely
on an expert's assessment of quality. Occasionally, such goods may appear to be
experience goods, as when a consumer eventually notices poor response times or
incompatibility with other systems; however, for many consumers, they may never
see any outward sign of poor performance.
For other types of digital goods, such as movies, music, and books, the
experience is in fact what the consumer is purchasing-the experience of viewing
the film, hearing the recording, or reading the book. Thus, the consumer can only
evaluate the good during its use. Vendors of such items have traditionally resisted
the return of these works once the consumer has experienced them, in part because
consumers may falsely report that the experience was unsatisfactory or defective
after having gained the benefit of one or more uses. Consumers who are in fact
dissatisfied with the work may be penalized by such policies, and therefore may rely

heavily on reputation when purchasing access to creative works. For example, if no
ticket refunds are issued once the movie has been viewed, or the music cannot be
returned once the package is opened, the reputation ofthe film director or musician
may be a crucial factor in the consumer's decision to make the initial purchase.
Consumer reliance on reputation will be equally important as these works are
delivered over the Internet. Additionally, reputational reliance may take on an added
dimension for digital works. For physical embodiments of creative works, no-return
policies are imperfect. For example, a bookstore may accept the return of a book
and have no way of knowing whether or not the purchaser has already read it. This

34. See generallyJohn Goldring, Netting the Cybershark: Consumer Protection,Cyberspace,
the Nation-State, and Democracy, in BORDERS INCYBERSPACE, supranote 33, at 322 (discussing
consumer protection in electronic commerce).
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will change with implementation of copyright management systems which monitor
and charge for each use of a digitized work. 5 Consequently, because every access
to a work may be monitored and billed, consumers will be forced to rely even more
heavily on reputation when purchasing access to works.
Finally, reputational reliance may reach its peak for purely informational works,
such as data, that are delivered online. By definition, these works are credence
goods. The data itself may be open to consumers' inspection, but they cannot assess
the data's accuracy or value without some prior or subsequent experience. This
suggests that the distinction between inspection and experience goods may be
largely arbitrary in the case of pure information. Where informational goods are
concerned, two types of information are commingled: the information good itself
and information about the information. It is the accessibility of this latter "metainformation" that distinguishes inspection, experience, and credence goods. When
physical goods are concerned, the good and the information about its characteristics
are readily separable. For informational goods, to the extent that the information is
embodied in a tangible medium, the medium may cloak important characteristics
of the information, revealing those characteristics over time as the user penetrates
the embodiment.
As information becomes less embodied, approaching pure information, the
information itself becomes more accessible, and none of its characteristics remain
hidden. However, meta-information regarding the information's value remains
elusive because this type of information is not available from the good in isolation;
rather, it lies embodied in context and relationships with other information. Such
contextual and relational information may be encapsulated in a trademark "signal."
Indeed, John Perry Barlow has suggested that as information becomes easy to copy
and distribute, the basis for value will lie in the context, relationship, and source of
the information-in essence, a shift from copyright value to trademark value.36
Thus, control of trademark rights will take on a heightened importance to both
consumers and businesses in electronic commerce.
III. DOMESTIC TRADEMARK RIGHTS
Having established the reasons for which trademarks will be critical to
electronic commerce, we are ready to turn to a discussion of how trademark law will
function against the backdrop of the Internet. The goal of this section is to
demonstrate that current principles of trademark law can yield coherent results when
applied to electronic commerce, beginning with application of United States

35. See Mark Stefik, TrustedSystems, Sci AM., Mar. 1997, at 78, 78-79; see also Julie E.Cohen,
A Rightto ReadAnonymously: A CloserLookat"CopyrightManagement"inCyberspace,28 CONN.
L. REV. 981, 983-89 (1996) (discussing the evolving copyright management technologies).
36. See John Perry Barlow, The Frameworkfor Economy of Ideas: Rethinking Patentsand

Copyrightsin the DigitalAge, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 83, 128-29; see also Esther Dyson, Intellectual
Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 136, 137-38 (discussing new embodiments of value for digital works).
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trademark doctrines to domestic Internet activity. Ironically, the crux of this
argument rests upon what may seem to be the body oftrademark law least adapted
to usage in the online world, the law of remote concurrent trademark usage.
A. TerritorialDoctrines
Much of the current legal focus on the Internet arises from the network's
geographic indeterminacy; the Internet not only spans geography, it renders
geography largely irrelevant to online operations such as electronic commerce. In
many cases, this may create anomalies when current territorially based legal
doctrines are applied to the Internet. Indeed, because trademark law is territorial, it
is cited as a prime example of a legal doctrine that cannot be rationally applied to
an online environment.37 But a closer examination of the function and purposes of
such territorial doctrines indicates that they can indeed be translated into the context
of electronic commerce. The legal needs that led to common-law development of
those doctrines exist both online and offline.

1. IndependentAdoption
At common law, trademark rights encompassed only the geographic territory
where the goods or services were actually sold, creating the possibility of concurrent
usage of the same or similar marks in remote areas.38 In general, trademark usage
was and is subject to a priority rule: the first or senior user of a mark holds superior
rights to that mark, and subsequent, or junior, users could be forced to cease using
the same or confusingly similar marks.39 However, this rule ofpriority applied only
if the marks came into conflicting use within the same geographic area.
Accordingly, if a subsequent user of the mark independently adopted the mark in
an area remote from the senior user's territory, then the junior user could develop
separate rights immune from the senior user's claim of priority.4"
The development of such concurrent usage rights is indicated by factors
showing independent acquisition of business goodwill, including a good faith
adoption ofthe mark by thejunior user." Ifthejunior user concurrently adopted the
mark intending to trade off of the senior user's established reputation, or intending
to capture business in areas that the senior user had not yet penetrated, then the

37. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law andBorders-TheRise ofLaw in Cyberspace,48
STAN L. REV. 1367, 1368-69 (1996).

38. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916).
39. See William Jay Gross, Comment, The TerritorialScope of TrademarkRights, 44 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1075, 1076-77 (1990).
40. Id. at 1077.
41. 3 J.THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIRCOMPETMON § 26:6,
at 26-12 (4th ed. 1997).
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senior user is entitled to enjoin this use of the mark.42 Knowledge of the senior
user's mark by the junior user at the time the junior user adopted the mark indicates
that the junior user intended to appropriate the reputation acquired by the senior
user.43 However, to constitute bad faith, thejunior user's knowledge and intent must
be directed to use of the mark in the same line of business as that ofthe senior user;
knowledge of use in a different line of business is not sufficient. 44
Similarly, to avoid infringement, thejunior user's employment ofthe mark must
take place in a region geographically divorced from the senior user's area of use.45
This not only ensures against consumer confusion between the two users, but also
provides some surety that the junior user's adoption was innocent and independent.
However, the requirement that the uses be wholly remote from one another could
be more easily satisfied in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the
doctrine was developed. Advances in communication and transportation have
significantly eroded the isolation of most local markets.46 Initially, courts recognized
this erosion in the context of motels and other travel-related services that depend on
the interstate highway system to draw nonlocal customers, which requires the
motels to advertise outside their local geographic area.47 This trend was soon
recognized for businesses generally. National or international advertising is
available even to small businesses via widely circulated print or electronic media. 8
Moreover, because consumers are more mobile, frequently vacationing in or
relocating to new areas, they bring with them associations between previously
encountered businesses and their trademarks.
Thus, the question of determining geographic remoteness is closely intertwined
with the question of determining market penetration for concurrent users of the
same or similar mark.49 Sporadic or inconsequential use of the mark in an area is
insufficient to bring it within the user's area of a common-law trademark." Rather,

42. See Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F.2d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1926).
43. Id. But see Thomas F. Cotter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, Where it Doesn't Exist:
Rethinking Two Doctrinesfrom the Common Law of Trademarks, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 487, 494
(1995) (criticizing the bad faith doctrine as "rather harsh").
44. See e.g., GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990) (requiring intent to
benefit from the reputation or goodwill of the senior user).

45. See 3 McCARTHY, supra note 41, § 26:4, at 26-9.
46. See 3A Louis ALTMAN, CALLMANONUNFAIRCOMPEnTION,TRADEMARKsANDMONOOLIES

§ 20.48, at 379 (4th ed. 1994); 2 JEROMEGILSoN,TRADEMARKPROTECTIONANDPRACTICE § 5.06[3],
at 5-112 (1997).
47. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 1987);
Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238,243 (N.D. Ala. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1965).
48. See, e.g., Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 617 (3d Cir. 1969)
(stating that "[s]o instant is our communication and so efficient our transportation that it can be said
that the American market place for most nationally advertised products is the entire United States").
49. See 3A ALTMAN, supra note 46, § 20.48, at 380.
50. See Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1400 (3d Cir. 1985);
Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 436 F.2d 705, 710 (8th Cir. 1971).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss4/4

12

Burk: Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce
1998]

TRADEMARK DOCTRINES FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

707

the market penetration of a user must be significant enough to create a real
likelihood of confusion among consumers when confronted with the concurrently
used mark. Factors including product advertising, volume of sales, growth or
decline in sales, and number of customers have all been held relevant to assessing
the scope of geographic rights." Advertising constitutes a particularly important
consideration, as much of the recognition accrued by a product depends upon the
level of promotion.
2. Zones ofExpansion
The boundaries of market penetration are not pristine, and courts have tended
to recognize a right to "zones of natural expansion" adjacent to the territory of
actual use.52 The exact limits of an area into which a remote user might reasonably
or naturally be expected to expand would again be a function of factors such as the
size and rate of previous expansion, business activity, advertising, and geographic
proximity; accordingly, mere hope of expansion is insufficient to establish such a
zone. 3 Additionally, the boundaries of the zone could be determined by priority of
usage: because the expansion zone is an area of expected use, and not actual use,
courts have established that the zone of expansion cannot preempt a "core" area
where a concurrent user has actually established goodwill in a mark.54 However,
where expansion zones might overlap, the priority ofthe senior user may overcome
the expectation of the junior user.
We might represent this common-law approach by a Venn diagram, such as that
shown in Figure 1. The two smaller black circles represent the core geographic area
in which different trademark users, each adopting the same or similar mark for
similar or identical goods or services, have used the mark in sales, advertising, or
services. The circles do not intersect, indicating that there is no overlap in the
respective geographic areas where the mark has been used. Each central core area
is surrounded by a shaded area representing the geographic zone of expansion into
which each user might naturally expand use of the mark. Like the core areas, these
areas also do not overlap. Thus, the senior user of the mark has no claim sufficient
to prevent the junior user from continued use ofthe mark in the core area or in the
zone ofexpansion. The geographic markets are remote from one another; therefore,
concurrent usage is possible.

51. NaturalFootwearLtd., 760 F.2d at 1398-99; Wrist-Rocket Mfg. v. Saunders Archery Co.,
578 F.2d 727, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1978).
52. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989);
Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland Grocery Corp., 301 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1962); Dawn Donut Co.
v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959); Rainbow Shops, Inc. v. Rainbow
Specialty Shops, Inc., 27 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
53. See Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 731 F.2d 415, 422 (7th Cir.

1984).
54. See, e.g., Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1028 (11th Cir.
1989) (stating that ' junior users whose uses are in good faith and 'remote' are protected").
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Figure 2 illustrates the more complex situation that may occur when the same
mark is independently adopted in geographically separate areas, but the likely zones
ofexpansion overlap. The dark circles representing the geographic core usage areas
are again quite separate, but the shaded areas representing the geographic zones of
expansion intersect. The shading of the zones of expansion for the senior and junior
users differ in this diagram. The shading for the senior user's zone preempts that of
the junior user's zone where they overlap. However, the senior user's zone of
expansion does not preempt the junior user's core area. By adopting the mark first,
the senior user gains common-law priority for expansion but does not have priority
in the areas where the junior user has previously employed the mark.
3. FederalRegistration
In the United States, state common-law rules regarding territorial trademark
rights have been incorporated into the system of federal trademark law under the
Lanham Act,55 but are substantially altered by federal law. Federal registration of
a mark affords nationwide constructive notice of use which legally negates the
possibility of an innocent and independent duplication of a registered mark.56 This
registrant from a subsequent user's adoption of his mark in a
protects the federal
57
remote area.
However, the federal registrant is not necessarily protected from a subsequent
user's adoption of the same mark prior to federal registration. 5 Federal trademark
rights, as provided for in the Lanham Act, are largely an extension of or overlay
upon the trademark rights developed by a user at common law-the goodwill or
recognition developed by usage remain the foundation of federal registration.
Between the time of the senior user's adoption of the mark and his registration of
the mark, a junior user may have developed common-law rights in the mark. The
federal trademark scheme allows for recognition ofthose rights by both the courts
and the registering authority.59 The Lanham Act provides for a "valid state right"
exception to the rights granted by federal registration, and courts have recognized
that this may negate the effect of federal registration in a local area where an
independent user has developed goodwill in a mark prior to a senior user's federal
registration.' However, federal registration freezes the junior user's territorial
expansion at its pre-registration boundary. 6'
Additionally, the Lanham Act provides for recognition of such concurrent

55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
56. See id. § 1072.
57. 3 McCARTHY, supra note 41, § 26:32, at 26-49.
58. See Spartan Food Sys., Inc. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1282 (4th Cir. 1987); Burger King
of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1968).

59. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1994).
60. See Burger King, 403 F.2d at 907.
61. See 3 McCARTHY, supranote 41, § 26:45, at 26-74.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss4/4

14

Burk: Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce

1998]

TRADEMARK DOCTRINES FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

709

rights through a concurrent registration proceeding.62 The Trademark Office may
issue concurrent registrations after a court finally determines that more than one
person is entitled to use a mark.6' Alternatively, the Trademark Office can make its
own determination that concurrent registration is proper if it finds that the
concurrent uses began prior to the earliest filing date of any registration or pending
application of the mark, provided that no confusion or deception will result from
continued concurrent use.' A concurrent user may initiate a Trademark Office
concurrent use proceeding by filing a registration application that alleges usage
prior to the opposing party's filing date.6" The Trademark Office may then issue
restricted registrations to the concurrent users, reflecting their respective superior
rights in discrete areas.'
The concurrent proceeding provision of the statute may also serve to implement
federal
policy of rewarding early filing by penalizing prior users who have slept
the
on their rights. 7 Particularly when the junior user's right to use the mark has
become incontestible under federal law, the junior user becomes entitled to
nationwide registration with a concurrent use reservation for the prior user's area
of usage.68 In determining the respective territorial restrictions, the Trademark
Office considers factors such as the user's level of business activity, plans for
expansion, dominance of contiguous areas, and possible market penetration; in
other words, the party's zone of expansion.69 This leaves open the possibility for a
prior user that files a tardy concurrent use application to preserve his common-law
area of actual usage and zone of natural expansion.
The common-law principle illustrated in Figure 2 is extended by federal
trademark law, shown in Figure 3. Once again, the two dark circles represent the
core territories in which senior and junior registrants of the same mark
independently developed business goodwill in the mark. However, federal
registration of the mark by the senior registrant effectively enlarges the registrant's
zone of expansion, indicated by the hatched area, to the entire United States,
including its territories and possessions. The constructive notice afforded by the
publication of the mark on the principle register negates any zone of expansion by
the junior registrant, but does not eliminate the junior registrant's area of actual use.
This area can be carved out of the senior registrant's registration by the concurrent

62. See id. § 20:8 1,at 20-126.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. The authorization for the Trademark Office to do so is scattered throughout the Lanham Act.
Section l(a)(A) ofthe Act provides for concurrent use applications. 15 U.S.C. § 1068 (1994). Section
18 of the Act directs the Trademark Office to determine and fix "conditions and limitations" for
concurrent registration. Id.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, an adjudicative body within the
Trademark Office, determines rights for concurrent use applications. 15 U.S.C. § 1067.
67. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523-24 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
68. 3 McCARTHY, supranote 41, § 26:53, at 26-86.
69. In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 475 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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registration power of the federal Trademark Office. °
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the situation in which a senior user is the junior
registrant. The senior registrant, although a junior user, is entitled by virtue of
prompt federal registration to not only the senior registrant's area of actual usage,
represented by the dark circle, but also to a nationwide zone of expansion, indicated
by the hatched area. The tardy senior user who files for concurrent registration
retains the right to the senior user's area of actual usage, which is carved out from
the senior registrant's national territory. Additionally, if the senior user can show
apotential for expansion, the senior user may be entitled to azone of expansion also
carved out of the junior user's national territory.
B. Market Segregation
The common law and federal doctrines allowing concurrent geographic use,
reviewed above, entail a specialized form of a more general trademark principle,
consumer confusion. The general principle is based upon the segregation of markets
within which consumers recognize, evaluate, and purchase goods.7' Trademark
users develop rights within these markets, which implies that the definition of the
market, in electronic commerce or otherwise, defines the scope of the rights. Thus,
an understanding of concurrent usage leads to a general theory of trademark rights,
both online and off.
1.

In/ringement

The relation of concurrent territorial usage to market segregation analysis
becomes clearer when we consider geographic scope as contained in doctrines of
trademark infringement. Infringement occurs when there is a likelihood that
consumers will confuse two similar marks.72 Federal courts hearing trademark
infringement cases have developed a list of factors to be examined in determining
whether confusion is likely.73 The exact list of these so-called "Polaroidfactors"
varies from circuit to circuit, but the core inquiry generally includes a comparison
of the similarity of the goods, the channels of marketing and advertising, the
strength of the marks, the respective cost of the goods, and the likelihood of
expanding the lines of goods.74 Significantly, the geographic overlap of the similar
marks is frequently a relevant infringement factor. 75
The inclusion ofterritorial scope within the list ofPolaroidfactors makes sense

70. See supratext accompanying notes 68-69.
71. See 3A ALTMAN, supra note 46, § 20.48, at 379.
72. 2 GiLSON, supranote 46, § 5.01[3], at 5-11.
73. Id. § 5.01[3][c][i], at 5-16.
74. Id. at 5-16 to -19. The term "Polaroidfactors" stems from the seminal case PolaroidCorp.

v. PolaradElecs.Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
75. 2 GILSON, supranote 46, § 5.06[1, at 5-100.
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considering that infringement is in many ways the obverse of secondary meaning.
A trademark user cannot have the user's rights infringed if the user has not
developed any rights. In the case of territorial usage, geographically segregated
consumers are unlikely to become confused about the source of products of which
they have never seen or heard.76 One might say that territorially separated
concurrent users of a mark have developed rights within distinct areas, or that the
consumers in the distinct areas are unlikely to become confused, but the statements
are largely equivalent.
Much the same may be said of the other Polaroid factors. One might
conceptualize the factors as a matter of likelihood of confusion, or as a matter of
concurrent spheres ofusage which may or may not overlap. For example, a software
package called "Boodle" is unlikely to be confused with laundry detergent sold
under the same name, which is to say that the software publisher has developed no
rights in the area of laundry detergent sales. However, consumers may be confused
if a competitor uses a confusingly similar mark on conceptually related goods, such
as computer peripherals.77 This suggests that the holder of a mark may develop
rights in the conceptual product area surrounding the mark's core usage-in
essence, a zone of product expansion paralleling that defined in the concurrent
territorial usage cases. Indeed, the courts used the term "zone of expansion" in
discussing a mark user's rights in related product lines.78
Similarly, a vendor that sells very expensive software called "Boodle" may not
have developed recognition among purchasers of cheap software, and so cheap
software with a similar trademark may not infringe. In other words, each of the
Polaroidfactorscontemplates a class of consumers within which two similar marks
may have developed distinct or overlapping spheres of recognition; if there is
recognition overlap, then one mark user's rights will be superior.
In general, classification of consumers defines what we call markets, and the
Polaroidfactorsare simply that-a list of market definitions. Ifthe allegedly similar
marks are affixed to different types of goods, then they are likely competing in
different markets. 79 Also, if the two products significantly differ in price, they are
likely competing in different markets. And, of course, if they are known and sold
in two geographically distinct areas, they are likely competing in different markets.
The definition of these markets determines whether rights in a given mark conflict
or not.
The confluence of these doctrines reveals that geographic scope is germane to

trademark rights for the same reason that it is often germane to antitrust analysis:
geographic scope may be relevant in determining the parameters of the relevant

76. See id. § 5.06[2], at 5-111; Gross, supra note 39, at 1078.
77. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 41, § 24:6, at 24-13.
78. See id. § 24:17, at 24-34 to -35.
79. See, e.g., Sidco Indus., Inc. v. Wimar Tahoe Corp., 795 F. Supp. 343, 347 (D. Or. 1992)
(finding that services offered in "geographically distinct areas" do not compete).
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market.80 In antitrust law, one must first define the relevant market before
determining whether a business has market power in that market and thus may be
guilty of an antitrust violation. 8' Similarly, in trademark law one must define the
relevant market in order to determine whether a mark has priority8 2in that market or
whether a confusingly similar mark is competing in that market.
Geographic scope is perhaps the best developed of these market definition

doctrines. For example, Trademark Office carve-outs for product price do not exist,
but no particular reason prevents us from creating them. Indeed, the Trademark
Office will register the same mark for differing products, creating a sort of carve-out
for product type.
Conceptually, then, we might well draw Venn diagrams, similar to those shown
for geographic scope, for the other market-defining Polaroidfactors. For example,
consider the situation where similar marks are found on differing goods, perhaps on
potatoes and automobile tires. In that instance, the marks appear to be competing
in separate, nonoverlapping markets, much as illustrated by the circles in Figure 1.
Also, each mark would presumably have some natural zone of expansion into
adjacent lines of goods or services. For instance, the potato grower might expand
into other lines of produce, and the tire manufacturer might expand into automotive
repair. But even these expanded lines of commerce are unlikely to overlap, and so
there is little likelihood of consumer confusion between the goods and services
associated with the similar marks.
In some situations, however, goods bearing similar marks may be closer in
market proximity, such as automobile tires and motorcycle mufflers. The core area
of each good may be quite distinct, but the possibility for overlap in their zones of
expansion, or "bridging the gap,"" is more substantial. In such an instance, as in
that of geographic scope, priority of use and priority of federal registration affects
the allocation of the mark.84 Just as in the case of geographic zones of expansion,
courts have held that a senior user cannot expand into a product line where ajunior
user has already developed rights, 5 precisely as illustrated by Figure 2.
This principle is obscured if one supposes that "[t]rademark law is distinctly
based on geographical separations." 86 In fact, a close examination of trademark
doctrine yields quite a different conclusion: trademark law is distinctly based upon
market separations, and that geographic separations are merely a surrogate or an

80. 1 Louis ALTMAN,

CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKs AND MONOPOLIES

§ 4.31, at 268 (4th ed. 1993).
81. See IIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL.,

ANTITRUST LAW 531 (1995).
82. See, e.g., NLC, Inc. v. Lenco Elecs., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1419, 1425-26 (E.D. Mo. 1992)
(examining the products' competitive proximity).
83. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 41, § 24:18, at 24-36.
84. See id. § 24:20, at 24-38 to -41.
85. Id. § 24:20, at 24-38; see Key Chem., Inc. v. Kelite Chem. Corp, 464 F.2d 1040, 1043

(C.C.P.A. 1972).
86. Johnson & Post, supra note 37, at 1368.
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approximation for defining the relevant market. The basis for all trademark law
is the goodwill or consumer reputation attached to a particular mark. Infringement
arises from interference between consumers' associations with respective marks. In
order to assess the likelihood of such interference, one must determine who the
relevant consumers may be, and this necessarily involves a determination of the
relevant markets-geographic or otherwise-for the competing goods.
Thus, two similar products with similar marks are presumed not to compete

with one another if they are in sufficiently distinct geographic markets. Conversely,
two products with similar marks may coexist in the same geographic area if the
products compete in sufficiently separate product consumption markets.88 The same
may be said of the other market-defining Polaroidfactors. And those factors may
be applied to distinguish separate markets online as well as offline.
2. Virtual Enclaves
Despite the apparent continuity of the Internet, factors such as price,
accessibility, consumer preference, and type ofgood will segregate online markets,
just as offline markets have been segregated.89 One can imagine, for example, a
merchant who develops goodwill in a mark used to sell antique tools on a Usenet
newsgroup devoted to collectors of such antique tools. Such usage would not likely
conflict with usage of a similar mark on a web site devoted to the sale of financial
data services. First, the two groups of consumers probably will not overlap; and
second, to the extent that a consumer may avail herself of both services, she is
unlikely to confuse the source of the two products because the concurrent uses of
the mark occur in different consumer markets. Thus, the use of the antique tool
mark on the newsgroup occurs within a virtual enclave defined by consumer usage
rather than by geographic distance.
This in turn suggests that the traditional rule governing offline concurrent
trademark usage should be sufficient to govern online concurrent trademark usage,
just as it has continued to govern concurrent usage in the face of previous media
developments, such as nationally circulated magazines, network broadcast, and
cable transmission. Consumer segregation by subject matter occurs in all these
widely accessible media. For example, one could imagine a magazine with
nationwide or even worldwide distribution devoted to collecting antique tools.
Despite the wide distribution of the magazine, those who are not collectors may not
recognize trademarks associated with it; as with the Internet, in reality the majority
of people do not become familiar with the mark although it is widely available. The
same would likely hold true for marks associated with specialized businesses

87. See 3A AL'TMAN, supranote 46, § 20.48, at 379.
88. Id.
89. See Joel R. Reidenberg, GoverningNetworks andRule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY

L.J. 911,917-18 (1996).
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advertising in the magazine; despite the wide availability of the advertising medium,
those marks could be essentially unknown to the average consumer.
With respect to the Internet, the presence of virtual enclaves means that
independent concurrent trademark rights can develop online and can be recognized
inthe registration process.' Just as the Trademark Office has long registered marks
with geographic carve-outs, it could just as well register marks with virtual carveouts. The concurrent use provisions of the Lanham Act authorize the Trademark
Office to issue concurrent registrations when the Office determines that two entities
have been making concurrent lawful use of a mark and that confusion, mistake, or
deception is not likely to result from the continued use of the mark under conditions
or limitations as to the mode or place ofuse of the marks.9 Sufficiently segregated
online usages could constitute distinct modes of usage under the statute.
Alternatively, we could leave such divisions to the courts under a likelihood of
confusion test, as we have done with the majority of the Polaroidfactor market
definitions.
Other types of market segregation may also occur in online commerce.
Electronic markets are also segregated by technological barriers-physical division
of hardware or virtual separation via software. 2 For example, some electronic
shopping areas or virtual malls on the Internet use password protection or
cryptographic authentication to exclude users on the basis ofsubscription, much as
wholesale shopping clubs exclude nonsubscribers in realspace. 3 Proprietary
networks such as America Online (AOL) and Prodigy require such subscriptions
for access to the content and services of their networks.94 These and other
technological barriers yet to be developed create market spaces within the network
by excluding certain consumers. This in turn implies that trademark recognition or
goodwill may differ between the included and excluded classes of consumers.95
Indeed, assuming the Trademark Office is empowered to authorize concurrent
online usage, virtual carve-outs might be implemented online via the use of access

90. See Johnson & Post, supranote 37, at 1395-96. The observation by Johnson and Post that the
Internet contains discrete areas, where diverse rule sets may emerge, is somewhat at odds with their
suggestion that territorial trademark principles will not map to the Internet. See supra text
accompanying note 37.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994).
92. See generallyWILLIAMJ. MITCHELL, CITYoFBrrs (1995) (discussing how the architecture
of the Internet creates virtual spaces); see also M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First
Amendment: Virtual Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CH. LEGAL F. 335 (discussing how
software structures online speech); Lawrence Lessig, IntellectualPropertyand Code, 11 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 637 (1996) (discussing how technological zoning can protect intellectual
property in cyberspace).
93. See MrrCHELL, supranote 92, at 88-92 (discussing the shopping analogy).
94. See Reidenberg, supranote 89, at 917.
95. Both Professors Lessig and Reidenberg have discussed how technological architecture can
be used to define the parameters of online conduct. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in
Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 896-901 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The
Formulationoflnformation PolicyRules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REv. 553 (1998).
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screening. Under such a system, a computer server may be instructed to deny access
to all requests from computer clients having a particular Interet protocol address
or domain origin. In the Boodle software example, registration for the trademark
might be given to the Internet user with an exclusion for usage on AOL. Use ofthe
mark on AOL would be given to the AOL Boodle seller. Of course, AOL
subscribers, having access to the Internet through their provider gateway, could
attempt to use the Internet Boodle rather than the AOL Boodle-unless the Internet
Boodle server denied access to all client requests originating from AOL's Internet
address. Such denial of access can technologically implement the legal allocation
of trademark rights.
Thus, assuming that trademark usage will, at least in some cases, occur within
non-overlapping market areas, concurrent usage may be allowed as under the
realspace territorial rule. But what of the geographic zone of expansion rule? In
theory, every point on the Internet is accessible from every other point if one only
knows the name or location of a desired resource. Search engines and autonomous
software agents readily provide names and locations. The Internet itself serves as
a medium for advertising and promoting knowledge of online resources.
Consequently, once product or service reputation expands out of a virtual enclave,
it theoretically could expand to fill the whole Internet. In such a case, the commonlaw zone of expansion might resemble that of the federal rule illustrated in Figures
3 and 4 rather than that illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Under these conditions, the
notice provision of federal registration appears almost superfluous.
In some instances, of course, the limits of reputational expansion may in fact
be the limits of the Internet itself. However, asserting this as the norm assumes that
consumer search costs on the network will be near zero. The concept of virtual
enclaves depends upon the observation that consumers will face obstacles in
obtaining information about products and product sources on the Internet and that
these costly barriers to acquiring such information exist in cyberspace as they do in
realspace, where the cost of overcoming distance or other barriers is what makes the
Polaroid factors relevant to determining consumer confusion. Thus, the same
barriers that permit the existence ofvirtual enclaves will restrain the zone of online
expansion.
Consequently, the analysis for online expansion zones does not differ

substantially from the established territoriality rule. I hesitate to rely on the
hackneyed "information superhighway" metaphor, but some limited comparison to
the United States' interstate highway system may be appropriate in this instance.
Courts long ago recognized that the availability of the interstate highway system
could seriously erode the trademark doctrine of geographic scope, especially for
travel-related services such as hotels and restaurants. Because the highway system
made consumers more mobile, the likelihood of identical marks growing up in

reputational isolation from one anotherwas significantly diminished.96 Nonetheless,

96. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837,844 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The rule
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the availability of the highway system did not suddenly transform a hotel's zone of
expansion to encompass the entire nation or even those areas accessible via the
highway system.97
Hunting the myriad branches of the Internet for a given product or service may,
for market segregation purposes, be equivalent to searching up and down the
nation's interstate highway system for a product or service. The Internet contains
such vast assemblages of information that no consumer can be personally
conversant with all of them; indeed, consumers will likely experience information
overload as more and more information vies for their attention. The current and
foreseeable technology of search engines and indexes will be similarly inadequate
to render all of the Internet's contents transparent. When technological barriers are
added to these practical barriers, the likely expansion of many online trademark

usages will be subject to measurable constraints.
3.

Online "Crossovers"

Notwithstanding that the Internet is and will be segmented by economic, social,
and technological divisions, those divisions will not necessarily map onto the
geographic, political, and economic divisions already existing offline. We take as
given the current technological structure of the Internet, which ignores customary
political and geographical boundaries on which much of our legal system is based.9"
The discussion thus far has shown that the network's present structure does not
preclude application of territorial trademark principles. But Internet commentators
have focused less on the potential for coherent application of law within the
network than upon the potential for disjunct application of law between the network
and the rest of the world.
Among such commentators, territorial trademark law is a principal example of
existing law that cannot possibly work online, and they conclude that a radical
overhaul of the law will be required to accommodate the new technology." In an
extreme version of the argument, the suggestion that the Internet must become a
separate jurisdiction with its own rules, governance, and adjudicatory mechanisms
is based on the supposed collapse of territorially based law.' 0 Closely related to this

has only limited applicability to services such as hotels or restaurants, because their customers 'are
ambulatory' .... ") (citations omitted).
97. See Matador Motor Inns, Inc. v. Matador Motel, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 385 (D.NJ. 1974).
98. See Reidenberg, supranote 95, at 586-92 (pointing out that technology is not static and can
itself be a means of regulation). Thus, the current architecture of the Internet could be redesigned in the
future to take geographic position into account
99. See Johnson & Post, supra note 37, at 1368-78 (setting out the trademark example in
cyberspace).
100. Id. at 1387-91; see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Governance: Town Hall
Democracy orRediscoveredRoyalism? 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413,417-19 (1997); David G.Post,
GoverningCyberspace,43 WAYNEL. REV. 155, 166-67 (1996) (describing the "law of the Internet");
see also Hardy, supranote 4, at 1052 (arguing that Internet users should form their own virtual court
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proposal is the suggestion to treat cyberspace as lying outside the territorial
jurisdiction of any nation, much as the high seas, the Antarctic continent, or outer
space are now treated under international law.'0'
These arguments rest in part upon the premise that geographically based rules
are simply unworkable for a medium that largely ignores geography. However, the
above discussion demonstrates that, at least for trademark law, this assertion is
untrue. By determining the purpose ofgeographically based trademark rules, we can
adapt traditional rules to serve the Internet. The Internet may not have a relevant
spatial geography, but it encompasses its own technological and market topology
to which rules can be adapted. Indeed, the concept of separate reputational markets
is a natural expansion of present trademark law that will capture many of the virtues
of the "cyberspace-as-a-separate-jurisdiction" approach without demanding a
radical and implausible overhaul of our jurisprudence.
Embedded within the debate over cyberspace sovereignty is an issue which
might at first appear to challenge the virtual enclave model-Internet activity cannot
be neatly compartmentalized into online and offline activity. Because Internet users

actually reside in some territory, their online conduct will inevitably spill over into
offline conduct. This overlap is of particular importance where legal questions of
identity and business reputation are concerned. For example, Johnson and Post have
suggested that "[i]f one country objects to the use of a mark on the web that
conflicts with a locally registered mark, the rebuttal would be that the mark has not
been used inside the country at all, but only on the web."'0" This of course is
incorrect because consumers who see the mark online also see the mark in a
different context offline, and carries those service or product associations with them
from one context to the other. Confusion may well arise in the consumers' minds,
and a reputational conflict between the online user of the mark and the offline user
of the mark is probably inevitable.
Thus, we cannot confine our discussion of trademark rights to online markets.
Interet markets will overlap with "realspace" markets because people are common
to both. Therefore, the question of separate trademark adoption will not be confined
to virtual enclaves. In many instances, contests over similar marks may prove to be
a contest between adoption in a cyberspace market and adoption in a realspace
market. For example, the crossover between realspace and cyberspace has been the
principal point of contention with regard to domain names: businesses that have
developed goodwill in marks such as "Disney" or "Kodak" in realspace desire to
use the mark in cyberspace, and with good reason. Internet users will likely be
familiar with such marks from their experiences in realspace. Consumers could well
be confused if Kodak were used by one business in realspace and by a different

system).
101. See, e.g., Matthew R. Burnstein, Note, Conflictson the Net: Choice ofLaw in Transnational
Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TItAsNA'L L. 75 (1996).
102. Johnson & Post, supranote 37, at 1380-81.
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business in cyberspace.
It is worth noting that, at some point, this type of reputational crossover will
begin to flow the other way. Businesses that first establish themselves on the
Intemet may develop significant goodwill in certain trademarks, and because their
online customers live in realspace, those businesses will desire that those marks be
protected from confusing uses offline. We might speculate that Yahoo! or
Amazon.corn could be good candidates for businesses that will develop cyberspace
reputations that will spill over into realspace markets.
The theory of rights in defined markets accommodates cross-over between
cyberspace and realspace. Note that in some instances, the separate circles depicted
in Figure 1 might stand for trademark rights in realspace and cyberspace
applications. If there is no significant overlap between the use of the mark in an
online market and independent adoption of the mark in an offline market, then each
user ofthe mark may develop rights to the mark in virtual isolation from the other.
It may be that Internet usage itself will in some instances delineate the proper border
between zones of usage, and that use in one type of online market will never expand
into use in a particular type of offline market. For example, consumers who use the
Internet and recognize Yahoo! as a mark for particular services might be a group
who will never encounter Yahoo! if used in a different market-perhaps the market
for something like manual typewriters.
Yet the separation of markets on the basis of Internet usage will rarely be so
pristine or simple, particularly if Internet usage becomes as ubiquitous as its
devotees suggest. At some point, independently adopted online and offline marks
may begin to overlap. An example might be the use of the trademark "Cyberia,"
which on the Internet has for some years been known as a listserv for discussion of
the law of cyberspace. It has also been adopted, probably quite independently, as
the title of a suite of software games distributed in realspace at computer stores.
Although individuals who frequent online discussion fora may also be persons who
would purchase game software, the two uses of the mark probably are not
confusingly similar so long as one use is online and the other is offline. However,
one can imagine that the natural zone of expansion for the Cyberia software vendor
might be to offer the product over the Internet or perhaps even to begin a discussion
group of the same name for players and enthusiasts of the software. However, if the
owner of the online Cyberia discussion forum has developed significant recognition
for his listserv, his common-law rights might serve to block the expansion of the
realspace software vendor into cyberspace markets.
4. Dilution
An additional difficulty regarding the application of current trademark laws to
online usage of trademarks concerns the doctrine of dilution. Dilution is the
blurring, or even tamishment, that can occur when a famous mark is used
concurrently on different types of goods-the use is actionable because the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss4/4
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concurrent use ofthe mark diminishes its distinctiveness. °3 Dilution is a matter of
particular relevance to the development of online trademark law, since the recently
enacted federal dilution statute has become a favorite vehicle for Interet-related
trademark claims." 4 Dilution claims have been used to prevent use of domain
names similar to existing trademarks, even where there was little likelihood of
confusion because the goods or services at issue were quite different than those
offered under the same mark by the plaintiff.0 5
Thus, dilution may appear to upset the market territory model outlined here:
dilution may occur across consumer markets, encompassing claims against use of
a similar mark on non-competing goods. Under a dilution theory, concurrent uses
of a mark in separate virtual enclaves appear to be precluded. However, dilution
theories are in fact consistent with the virtual enclave model. Dilution, particularly
by blurring, delineates a different type of market or territory. The cause of action for
dilution recognizes that modem trademarks do not compete for market share so6
much as they compete for mindshare, that is, for the attention of the consumer."'
Economists have recognized that attention and clutter can be significant costs
in the marketplace. 7 Consumers have limited attention, and the more goods that
are offered in the marketplace, the more difficult it is for consumers to find what
they want. This implies that any trademark may lose incremental value as the
number of goods competing for consumer attention increases. Marks are
increasingly selected for their ability to capture attention, not simply to signal a
source. Thus, a particular loss of value occurs when a famous mark is used
repeatedly in the marketplace, even on goods or services that are unlikely to be
confused. As the famous mark becomes commonplace, it loses its ability to attract
a share of consumers' finite attention.'~ The claim for dilution is properly limited
to famous marks that are most likely to compete for mindshare in this way.
Thus, a Venn diagram for dilution would not represent the extent of a product
market held by a trademark owner, but rather the share of consumer attention
commanded by the mark. The definition of dilution will dictate that the attention
area will resemble that of the federal registrant in Figure 3. Diminution of

103. See 3 MCCARTHY, supranote 41, § 24:67 to :69, at 24-115 to -117.
104. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 1998). See, e.g., Toys "R" Us Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1839 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (toy store's mark diluted by the mark
"adultsrus.com"); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1240 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (dilution by
cyber-squatter use).
105. See generally 2 GILsON, supranote 46, § 5.11[4][b], at 5-239 (discussing domain name
dilution cases).
106. Cf. Landes & Posner, TrademarkLaw, supra note 15, at 307 (explaining that dilution
prevents "distracting and inappropriate associations").
107. See Jeffrey MacKie-Mason et al., Service Architecture and Content Provision: The
Network Provideras Editor, in THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 191, 202-04
(Gerald W. Brock & Gregory L. Rosston eds., 1996).
108. Cf. Richard A. Posner, When is ParodyFair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STuD. 67, 75 (1992)
(asserting that trademarks are less efficient as signals when the consumer must sort through multiple
associations).
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mindshare will not be confined to a particular product market any more than it will
be confined to a particular geographic market-the famous marks protected are

those that will have penetrated essentially every geographic market. Nor will
dilution be confined by the parameters of online and offline usage; online usage will
still lead to dilution offline. Thus the dilution cause of action does not contradict the
virtual enclave model, it simply contemplates a separate type of enclave from
product markets.
IV. INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS

The discussion of trademark rights thus far has focused primarily on the
application of existing law to online usage within the United States and has shown
that current law can be readily adapted to such usage. However, because the Internet
is international in scope, only a theory that encompasses international trademark
usage will be truly conducive to the development of global electronic commerce.
Thus, we must turn our attention to whether the analysis set out above is sufficiently
robust to address such international usage, or whether substantial modifications are
necessary. The applicability ofthe market zone approach to international usage may
differ somewhat between the two sources of trademark rights analyzed above,
respectively, the common law and federal statutory law.
A. Common-Law Rights
Because the geographic market inquiry is grounded in the likelihood of
confusion test, common-law principles are quite capable of spanning national
borders. The inquiry is not whether an unauthorized use has occurred within a
certain territory, but whether a particular use is likely to cause confusion. Inquiry
into the limits of geographic or other market boundaries is merely an aid to
determine the likelihood of confusion. Thus, famous or well-known marks may well
leap oceans and rivers, cross national borders, and span language barriers to achieve
international recognition. They may frequently be protectable even when the foreign
good or service to which they are attached is not yet readily available.
Early illustrations of this principle occurred in the context of restaurant
names."° For example, in Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., restaurant operators in
New York adopted the name and decor of the internationally famous Parisian
restaurant, Maxim's."' On the basis of their international reputation, the owners of
the Parisian Maxim's successfully enjoined the use of the name even though they
did not operate and had no intention of operating an establishment in New York.
Although the case was decided on unfair competition grounds rather than strict
109. See Vaudable v. Monmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1959); see also Stork
Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 364 (9th Cir. 1948) (issuing an injunction against a San
Francisco user of a mark associated with a famous New York nightclub).
110. Vaudable, 193 N.Y.S.2d. at 334.
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trademark law,"' it has led to an expectation that famous marks will be protected
from appropriation in the United States, even if they have never been used here,
thus effectively recognizing an international zone of expansion.
This principle has most often been associated with the question of whether
adoption of a mark known outside the United States by a subsequent U.S. user was
in bad faith. If a mark was adopted with knowledge of the foreign mark, and in
orderto capitalize on its reputation, then the adoption may have been in bad faith." 2
This doctrine largely tracked the territorial rule for adoption of a mark by a remote

junior user under common-law principles of concurrent territorial usage. However,
in Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman,"' the Federal Circuit expressly declined to
apply doctrines of concurrent territorial use and severely restricted the meaning of
bad faith. In Person'sCo. a U.S. user purposefully copied the mark of a Japanese
clothing manufacturer who subsequently attempted to enter the North American
market." 4 Although the Japanese owner argued that the defendant was equivalent
to a remote junior user whose adoption of the mark was in bad faith, the court held
that knowledge of prior use in a foreign nation did not constitute bad faith if the
U.S. user was unaware that the foreign user intended to enter the U.S. market and
the foreign mark was not famous." 5 Because the Japanese user had no goodwill in
the United States for the defendant
to misappropriate, adoption of the mark could
6
not have been in bad faith.]
Where truly territorial usage is at issue, the common-law zone of expansion rule
may span national borders, whether or not a mark is famous. In Koffler Stores,Ltd.
v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc.,"7 Koffler operated retail drug outlets in Ontario,
Canada, in close proximity to the U.S. border. " Koffler engaged in Canadian radio
advertising which spilled over the U.S. border into Detroit and beyond." 9 In a
dispute that arose when the Detroit-based defendant subsequently used a similar
mark for retail drug stores, the court applied common-law territoriality principles
to hold that the Detroit defendant was within Koffler's natural zone ofexpansion. 20
The fact that Koffler's zone of expansion happened to extend over the border was
of no consequence to delimiting the area.
In the world of electronic commerce, either of these lines of cases may be

111. Id. at335.
112. See, e.g., Davidoff Extension, S.A. v. DavidoffInt'l, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 465, 467
(S.D. Ha. 1983) (emphasizing knowledge of the mark).
113. 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

114. Id. at 1566-67.
115. Id. at 1569-70.
116. Id.; accordButi v. Perosa, S.R.L., No. 96-9630, 1998 WL 107690 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1998);
cf Cotter, supranote 43, at 539-41 (arguing that bad faith for infringement is different than bad faith
for concurrent use).
117. 434 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
118. Id. at 699.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 704.
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sufficient to afford foreign trademark holders common-law protection in the United
States. The Internet may make many marks internationally known due to spill over
from online usage to offline recognition. Additionally, it will be harder for ajunior
U.S. adopter to deny the knowledge necessary for bad faith because online usage
of the mark will make entry into U.S. markets almost inevitable. Similarly, under
a Koffler analysis, the Internet may make U.S. markets part of an online user's
natural zone of expansion, much as outlined above for domestic common-law users.
Cases considering common-law rights offoreigntrademark holders suggest that
they can develop areas of territorial recognition, and even zones of expansion, that
extend into United States territory. The inverse of this principle presents a rather
more complicated question: whether the reputational ambit of U.S. firms can
properly be extended beyond U.S. borders. The obstacles here arise largely from the
nature ofthe federal system: common-law trademark recognition is a matter of state
law, but as parts of a federation, the states are not wholly independent legal actors.
Although the states retain many aspects of sovereignty, their local laws may be
constrained by either the interests of their sister states or by the interests of the
nation as a whole. In particular, the federal constitution allots to the federal
government primary responsibility for dealing with foreign governments.' 2'
Where cybermarks are concerned, at least two situations raise these federalism
concerns. First, the court must be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
foreign defendant before common-law rights can be enforced against a foreign
defendant. However, the constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause limit the ability of state courts to reach
extraterritorial defendants." The United States Supreme Court has set out

minimum contacts criteria for assertion ofpersonal jurisdiction: the defendant must
have reasonably foreseen the possibility ofdefending a suit in that forum." I have
elsewhere articulated at length several reasons why the technological limitations of
online interaction may make these criteria difficult to meet,but they are in essence
the same reasons that I have argued will make trademark law important for
electronic commerce: within a networked system it is extremely difficult to
determine who one is interacting with and where that person is located. 4
The confluence of these effects may have anomalous results with regard to
personal jurisdiction in trademark suits. When a defendant engages in purposefully
passing off online goods or services through trademark misappropriation and a
plaintiff brings suit in a state where consumer confusion has or is likely to occur,
the defendant has by definition purposefully directed his activity toward the
forum.' Several decisions in the domain name area have already reached this

121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
122. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1980).
123. BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 472-74.
124. See Dan L. Burk, Federalismin Cyberspace,28 U. CONN. L. REv. 1095, 1111-15 (1996).
125. See Dan L. Burk Jurisdictionin a World Without Borders,1 VA. J. L. & TECH. 3, 44-52
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conclusion. 126 However, the situation is far more ambiguous in the case of innocent
or negligent trademark infringement where a foreign user innocently adopts a mark
confusingly similar to a U.S. mark with no intention or expectation of directing his
activity toward any state in the United States. 27 Innocent infringement scenarios
direction of activity toward the plaintiff s home
make the argument for purposeful
2
forum far less compelling.1 1
The minimum contacts inquiry also entails weighing several fairness factors to
help determine whether subjecting an out-of-state defendant to a legal proceeding
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 29 When
jurisdiction over foreign nationals is at issue, the Court has articulated two
particular fairness factors that must be considered. 3 ° First, the court must consider
the potential interference with "the procedural and substantive policies of other
nations whose interest is affected by the assertion of jurisdiction."'' Second, the
court must consider whether the assertion ofjurisdiction might impact or impede
the foreign relations policies of the United States. 3 2 As electronic commerce
becomes increasingly international, the instances where these questions arise will
become increasingly common. It may be that exercise of state courtjurisdiction over
online trademark disputes will frequently appear imprudent, either because of
interference with other sovereigns or because of interference with a federal policy.
The second potential limitation on the exercise of state authority over online

(Feb. 1, 1997) <http://www.student.virginia.edu/-vjolt/voll/burk.htm>.
126. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 470 (D. Mass.
1997) (finding purposeful availment where defendant's web site mirrored the plaintiff's site in
Massachusetts); MaritzInc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328,1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holdingthat
through its Internet activities the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in the state); see also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621-22 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) (finding that the defendant purposefully directed activity to the forum of plaintiff's business
by engaging in trademark domain name "squatting").
127. I have noted elsewhere that this may create an unusual jurisdictional situation in which no
single forum has sufficient contacts to constitute purposeful availment. Under such a situation, a federal
court hearing a Lanham Act claim may invoke special nationwide jurisdiction. Federal courts are
constrained by the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, but are usually
empowered by Congress to exercise jurisdiction only to the same extent as permitted in a state court
sitting in the same venue. See Burk, supranote 125, at 32-33. However, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k)(2), a district court may look to the nation as a whole to aggregate contacts if the
jurisdiction conferred under the local long arm statute is insufficient and ifjurisdiction would not lie
in any other district. See, e.g., Eskofot A/S v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 86-87
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (antitrust and Sherman Act claims). Thus, it is possible that in some cases a federal
court could reach diffuse online trademark contacts thatwouldnotsupportjurisdictionin any individual
state. See Burk, supranote 125, at 52; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders?
Choice ofForum and Choice of Lawfor CopyrightInfringement in Cyberspace, 15 CARDozo ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 153, 160-65 (1997) (discussing FED.R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) in an international example).
128. See Burk, supranote 125, 56.
129. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-78.

130. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
131. Id
132. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1998

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:695

trademark usage is found in the negative implications of the foreign commerce
clause.' The jurisprudence of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is more
scanty than that of the Due Process Clause, but striking parallels exist, especially
with regard to relations of the states to foreign nations. The Court has indicated that
states have considerable latitude when handling foreign entities within the area of
their traditional powers.1 4 However, at some point, uncoordinated state action
against foreign entities begins to intrude upon the foreign commerce powers
reserved to the federal government; at that point, state regulation may be
constitutionally preempted.'35 Similar to the due process international fairness
factors, the advent of international online commerce likely will multiply the
situations in which state regulation and taxation may exceed the limits necessitated
by the federal system. 6
B. ExtraterritorialActivity
The constitutional discussion above suggests that Congress, rather than the
states, is in the best position to determine whether U.S. law should be extended into
the international arena. Such an extraterritorial extension of the law first requires
some prescriptive basis for Congress to authorize extraterritorial application of the
law, and second, an indication to the courts that Congress has in fact done so.
Current trademark jurisprudence addresses each of these requirements in a unique
manner which has important consequences for online trademark usage.
1.

Legislative Competence

In considering the extraterritorial dimensions of a statutory scheme, the
fundamental inquiry must be of the basis of legislative authority. Depending upon
the prescriptive authority recognized, the sovereign may or may not have the ability
to prescribe law at a given time or in a given place. Canons of international law
recognize a variety of bases for such sovereign authority, including:
territorial jurisdiction-the principle that a sovereign has authority within
its geographic territory;'

133. See generallyBurk, supra note 124, at 1123-34 (discussing dormant commerce limitations
on state Internet regulation).
134. See, e.g., Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 316-20 (1994) (upholding
against a dormant commerce clause challenge states' consideration of foreign affiliates of domestic
corporations in setting tax rates for domestic subsidiaries).
135. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 450-51 (1987); see also
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 435 (1968) (holding that a state probate disposition testing the
"democracy quotient" of foreign nations violates federal prerogatives in foreign relations).
136. Cf.American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that an
overly broad New York statute regulating the Internet offended the dormant commerce clause).
137. See REsTATEMENTC(THiRD) OFTHEFOREIGNRELATIONS LAW § 402(l) (1987) [hereinafter
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nationality jurisdiction-the principle that a sovereign has authority over
its citizens, wherever they may be geographically located; 3 8
objective jurisdiction-the principle that a sovereign has authority over
conduct directed toward producing an effect within its territory; 3 9
universal jurisdiction-the principle that any sovereign has authority over
certain universal crimes, such as piracy or genocide, wherever the
perpetrators are found;14
protective jurisdiction-the principle that a sovereign may assert authority

over perpetrators of certain acts, such as forgery of the sovereign's
currency, that threaten the sovereign's stability, wherever those acts
take place; 141 and
passive personal jurisdiction-the principle that a sovereign may assert
jurisdiction over persons whose extraterritorial actions substantially
affect the sovereign's nationals, wherever located. 42
The oldest and best recognized of these doctrines is that of territoriality, which
ties the exercise of power to the fairly predictable geographic boundaries controlled
by the sovereign. 43 Nationality jurisdiction also enjoys wide acceptance, as it again
channels the conduct of sovereigns into relatively predictable areas which will
generally tend not to conflict with the sovereignty of other nations. However, other
prescriptive doctrines, such as objective or passive personal jurisdiction, tend to
facilitate more free-ranging exercises of power and may give rise to international
conflicts, especially when an assertion of sovereignty intrudes on another
sovereign's borders.'44
The general presumption in U.S. law, articulated repeatedly by the Supreme
Court, has been that unless Congress expressly indicates otherwise, statutes are
presumed to be territorially circumscribed. 4 s This presumption was adopted in part

FOREIGNRELATIONS LAW]; see alsoMARKW. JANIS, ANINTRODUCrIONTO INTERNATIONALLAW 322-

24 (2d ed. 1993).
138. See FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supranote 137, § 402(2). See generallyJANIS, supranote
135, at 324-26.
139. See FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supranote 137, § 402(1)(c); JAIS, supranote 137, at 32628.
140. See FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supranote 137, § 402(3); JANIS, supra note 137, at 329.
141. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985) (regarding Nazi war
criminal who committed crimes against Israel and all other nations); JANIS, supranote 137, at 328-29.
142. JANIS, supra note 137, at 330.
143. Id. at 322.
144. See id. at 326-30.
145. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991) (application ofTitle VII
to U.S. employers of American citizens abroad); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1963) (extension of the National Labor Relations Act); Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 142 (1957) (application of the Labor Management
Relations Actto a foreign ship docked in United States Territory); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949) (application of the Eight Hour Law to a contract between the United States and a
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to avoid potential conflicts with the substantive law of other nations. 46 Thus, the
presumption places the majority of U.S. statutes on the most firm and widely
accepted basis of sovereign authority, while recognizing legislative competence to
exercise sovereignty on some other basis. Congress can exercise authority on one
of these other more controversial bases, but the Court will not presume this to be the
case without some indication that the legislature intends to do so. 47 Additionally,
this approach also implies an inherent separation of powers rationale: if Congress,
with its responsibilities for foreign relations, wishes to potentially intrude on the
prerogatives of other sovereigns, then it can explicitly do so, but the courts will not
take it upon themselves to infer such an intent.
The federal statutes that give rise to intellectual property contain no express
exercise ofextraterritorial authority, but due to the territoriality presumption, courts48
have repeatedly held that U.S. patent and copyright law is territorial in nature.'
Courts have treated federal trademark law differently, in part because of its
constitutional pedigree. Unlike the patent and copyright statutes, which rest upon
the patent and copyright clause, the Lanham Act draws upon the constitutional
commerce power, and the statute contains language extending the Act to "all
commerce" that may be lawfully regulated by Congress.149 This would include not
only interstate commerce, but also foreign commerce. The courts have interpreted
this language as express authority to apply
the Lanham Act extraterritorially, and
50
they have done so with some frequency.

For example, the seminal case applying the Lanham Act to acts outside of U.S.
borders is the Court's decision in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.' The defendant,
Steele, had been purchasing unmarked watch components from the United States
and Switzerland; he assembled and sold them in Mexico under the mark Bulova.'52
Some of these watches found their way back into the United States, and the Bulova
Watch Company, a U.S. company and registrant of the Bulova mark in the United
States, sued for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Because the statute

private contractor for work in Iran and Iraq); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,
357 (1909) (property damage by Costa Rican Officers acting outside of Costa Rica's territory).
146. ArabianAm. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248.

147. See id. at 255.
148. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (patent law);
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (copyright).

See generally Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectualPropertyRights in an Age of Globalism,37
VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 520-35 (1997) (examining the extraterritorial application of intellectual property

law).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1127(1994).
150. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,284-87 (1952); Nintendo of America,
Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1994); American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice
Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG,
14 F.3d 733,745 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing Steele); Totalplan Corp. ofAmerica v. Colbore, 14 F.3d
824, 830 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing Steele).
151. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).

152. Id at 285.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss4/4

32

Burk: Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce

1998]

TRADEMARK DOCTRINES FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

727

expressly indicated that it could be applied to all commerce, including foreign
commerce, lawfully within Congressional purview, the Court held that relief was
proper under the Act."'3 The Court indicated three factors that favored
extraterritorial application of the statute. First, even though the actions in question
were extraterritorial, the facts showed that Steele was a U.S. citizen." 4 Second, the
155
Court found that Steele's extraterritorial actions had an effect on U.S. commerce.
Third, the Court found that exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction would not offend
the substantive law of Mexico; although Steele had registered the Bulova
mark
56
under the Mexican trademark law, his registration had been canceled.'
The test articulated in Steele generally fits well within the sovereignty
framework of customary international law. The first two factors in the Court's
analysis accommodate the employment ofthe foreign commerce power to principles
of legislative competence by placing the Lanham Act within the purview of
nonterritorial bases for jurisdictional authority. The first factor, regarding
citizenship, appears to rely on nationality authority, creating a basis for application
of the Act to U.S. citizens, wherever they are located geographically. The third
factor of the test, regarding interference with the substantive law of other nations,
57
incorporates well-accepted notions of international comity into the analysis.
The second factor, regarding the impact on U.S. commerce, ties the statutory
grant of authority to principles resembling passive personal jurisdiction where the
extraterritorial activity has an effect withinthe U.S. This factor of the test is perhaps
the only potentially troubling portion of the analysis. As a basis for extraterritorial
jurisdiction, nationality principles are fairly well accepted, but passive personal
jurisdiction principles may be controversial. An offshore activity that has an effect
on U.S. commerce may not provide a sufficiently clear tie to U.S. sovereignty to
allow an uncontroverted assertion of jurisdiction. The application of the Steele
standards to the Internet will likely feed this controversy.

153. Id. at 289.
154. Id. at281.
155. Id. at 285.
156. See id.; accordNintendoof America, Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246,250 (4th Cir.
1994) (applying the tripartite test); Totalplan Corp. of America v. Colbome, 14 F.3d 824, 830 (2d Cir.
1994) (using the Steele factors to decline jurisdiction); American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers
Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983) (using the Steele factors to support extraterritorial
jurisdiction). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has developed its own multipart test, which
essentially expands the Steele test.See Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552,554
(9th Cir. 1992).
157. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) ("Comity' . . . is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or
ofother persons who are under the protection ofits laws."); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading
Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 n.1 (11th Cir. 1995) (discussing the Steele comity element).
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2. Applying Steele to the Internet
In considering the extraterritorial application of trademark law to electronic
commerce, the first question is whether the application of U.S. trademark law to
offshore Internet activity is an extraterritorial application of the statute. Arguably,
use of a mark on the Internet may constitute use of the mark in the United States
when the materials displaying the mark are accessible in the United States.'58 The
case for domestic use is even stronger if goods associated with the mark are
downloaded or shipped into the United States, or if services associated with the
mark are performed for individuals or entities residing in the United States. Such
uses might be said to occur in the United States regardless of the physical situs of
the files containing the mark, the server hosting those files, or the individuals
responsible for the files.
One case to date approaches this issue, albeit without directly answering the
question. In PlayboyEnterprises,Inc. v. ChuckleberryPublishing,Inc.5 9 the court
discussed whether posting materials on an Italian web site was a distribution in the
United States.'" Playboy had previously brought actions in both the United States
and Italy to enjoin the Italian defendant's use of the mark "Playmen" in a printed
magazine; U.S. courts held that the magazine's use infringed Playboy's rights and
issued a permanent injunction against distribution of the Italian magazine in the
United States.' Italian courts, however, held the magazine's use of the mark
permissible under Italian trademark law.'62 The magazine subsequently developed
a web site for "Playmen" which was based in Italy, but accessible worldwide.
Playboy sought a contempt order for the web activity as a violation of the U.S.
court's permanent injunction. 63 The U.S. court held that the web site was
equivalent to distribution of the magazine in the United States and ordered the
defendant to block access to U.S. Internet users."6
This holding is intriguing, but should be approached with considerable
caution.' 6 In evaluating the court's decision in Chucklebery, it is critical to place

158. Cf. Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territorialityand Infringement on Global
ComputerNetworks, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1, 38-41 (1993) (discussing whether offshore use of networked
software is "use" for purposes of the patent statute). However, indirect effects on U.S. commerce may
be enough to infringe the rights of U.S. trademark holders. See Levi Strauss, 51 F.3d at 985.
159. 939 F. Supp 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying reconsideration).

160. Id. at 1036.
161. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 687 F.2d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1982).
162. Id. at 569 n.3.
163. Chuckleberry, 939 F. Supp. at 1035.
164. Id. at 1039-40. On motion for rehearing, the court showed little sympathy for the fact that
its order was essentially impossible to implement given present Internet technology. "If technology
cannot identify the country of origin of e-mail addresses, these passwords and users IDs should be sent
by mail." Id. at 1045 n.4.
165. Some ofthe early commentary on this case has used the district court opinion as a launching
point for rather wide-ranging speculation. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritorialityand
Multiterritorialityin Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 589 ("Assume that this
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the opinion in its procedural context. The court was exercising continuing
jurisdiction over the defendant under a permanent injunction entered pursuant to
antecedent litigation regarding the defendant's North American distribution of a
magazine under a mark confusingly similar to the plaintiff s." It is unclear whether
the court could have asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant in an original
action disputing the use of the mark "Playmen" on an Italian web site. However,
remedial equity acts inpersonam,167 and acourt of equity has considerable latitude
to achieve ajust and fair result. 68 Given that the defendant was already before the
court subject to its previous order, a modification of the order required no new
jurisdictional assertion.
Similar caution is required when considering the Chuckleberrycourt's holding
that a defendant's sponsorship of a web site was equivalent to a distribution of a
magazine within the United States. In this case the court was interpreting the
question of distribution for purposes of a previously issued injunction, not for
purposes of the Lanham Act. Again, a court sitting in equity has considerable
latitude in tailoring its remedy to achieve a just and fair result. The court
acknowledged this in its consideration of whether the original injunction covered
materials on the World Wide Web and candidly admitted that the Internet could not
have been within the contemplation of the court when issuing the original order in
1981 69 The holding that the defendant was distributing material was an equitable
determination designed to effectuate the purpose of the 1981 order, not an
interpretive conclusion based on the trademark statute.
If the offshore physical situs of computer files, servers, or persons associated
with an online mark are taken into account rather than U.S. accessibility of the
branded material, an offshore defendant might still be subjected to the standards of
the Lanham Act under the extraterritoriality doctrine. Under the test articulated in
Steele, confusingly similar uses that occur wholly outside the United States may be
reached by U.S. courts if they have some impact on U.S. commerce. The ubiquitous
reach of the Internet may actually help to satisfy the first requirement of the Steele
test; as electronic commerce grows more common, use of a confusingly similar
mark on the Internet has an increased probability of affecting U.S. commerce.
Such a result could also occur due to the reputational aspect of trademark
rights. For example, inLeviStraussthe defendant manufactured unauthorized goods
bearing the Levi Strauss label in the People's Republic of China.17 The
unauthorized goods were shipped through the United States, but never offered for
[Chuckleberrycase] had been a copyright infringement case rather than a trademark infringement case
and that it had not arisen as a contempt proceeding."); see also Ginsburg, supra note 127, at 163-64
(discussing the Chuckleberry distribution analysis in the context of contributory copyright
infringement).
166. Chuckleberry,939 F. Supp. at 1036 n.4.
167. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 2.1(1), 2.9(1) (2d ed. 1993).
168. See id. § 2.4(7).
169. Chuckleberry,939 F. Supp. at 1037.
170. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 984 (1lth Cir. 1995).
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sale in the United States.'7 However, relying on Steele, the court held that
extraterritorial sales of substandard goods could adversely affect the plaintiff's
business reputation and applied the Lanham Act extraterritorially"' One can easily
envision similar situations in electronic commerce where goods or services sold
outside the United States under confusingly similar marks may adversely impact
American firms offering their goods or services online. This may become especially
prevalent as U.S. firms use the Internet to penetrate international markets that they
might not have previously reached.
The analysis in Levi Strauss suggests that as the reach of electronic commerce
spreads, the first factor in Steele will be satisfied more often, and U.S. trademark
holders may be able to reach confusingly similar use of online marks. At the same
time, however, the global reach ofthe Internet may tend to shift the second and third
factors of the Steele test against extraterritorial application of U.S. trademark law.
As international access to electronic commerce grows, it will be increasingly likely
that offshore use of confusingly similar marks will involve foreigners. The spread
ofelectronic commerce will also increase the likelihood that application of U.S. law
will substantially interfere with the law of other nations.
Additionally, to the extent that the Internet may increase the potential for
expanded reach of U.S. trademark law under the first factor of the Steele test, this
effect may concomitantly be balanced by an increased opportunity for foreign
trademark users to reach U.S. infringers. In the past, U.S. courts have held that
wholly foreign use of a mark, which has no impact on U.S. commerce, cannot give

rise to a cause of action under the Lanham Act because Congress has not extended
the Act's reach to such conduct. For example, such a reverse-Steele holding was
reached by the Federal Circuit in Person'sCo. v. Christman'73 to deny relief to a
Japanese trademark holder and its U.S. licensee. The defendant in the case had
visited Japan, seen clothing sold there under the plaintiff's mark, returned to the
United States, and begun manufacturing and selling copies under an identical mark,
which it registered with the U.S. Trademark office." Prior to that,the plaintiff had
done no business in the United States, but attempted to cancel the defendant's
registration after expanding its business to the United States.'75 Both the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board and the Federal Circuit declined to cancel the registration.
The Federal Circuit held that the Japanese use of the mark could not form the basis
for registration under the Lanham Act, because such wholly foreign use had no
effect on U.S. commerce. 76

171. Id. at 984-85.
172. Id.at 985; accordBabbitElec. Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1161,1180 (11th Cir. 1994)
(applying the Lanham Act to sales ofcordless telephones outside the United States when the telephones
were shipped through a United States free trade zone).
173. 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
174. Id. at 1567.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1568-69.
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In an increasingly networked world, the holding in cases such as Person'sCo.
might be substantially altered as the Internet decreases the frequency with which use
of a mark will be "wholly foreign." Employment of a mark on the Internet is more
likely to reach the United States and, therefore, affect U.S. commerce.' Just as the
first Steele factor may more frequently be satisfied in a networked world because
of the effect of foreign infringement on U.S. commerce, so too will the prerequisites
for enforcement against domestic infringers more often be satisfied in a networked
world.
3. InternationalRegistration
Offshore trademark owners will not be entirely without federal recourse against
concurrent users or infringers in the United States.'78 The Lanham Act provides for
enforcement of common-law rights, and we have seen that foreign businesses may
accrue such rights through online trademark usage. The United States is also
signatory to the Paris Convention, an international treaty governing, among other
'
things, standards of trademark law. 79
Because of the U.S. treaty obligations under
the Paris Convention, foreign trademark users do have a right under the Lanham
Act to register their marks in the United States.'8 ° A foreign trademark user may
apply for U.S. registration under section 1 or 44 of the Lanham Act, either by
showing intentto use or actual use of the mark in the United States.' 8 ' However, the
registrant need not show actual use in the United States. Section 44 extends such
registration rights to parties whose country of origin is either signatory to a
convention or treaty relating to intellectual property rights to which the U.S. is also
signatory, or a country which grants reciprocal rights to the U.S.'82
However, these provisions affect only registration, and not substantive rights
in the mark. The Paris Convention itself is not a source of international trademark
rights; rather, it is based upon principles of national treatment 8 3 Parties to the
convention must accord the citizens of other signatory nations the same rights that

177. However, the foreign mark must also be in use in the United States. See Buti v. Perosa,
S.R.L., No. 96-9630, 1998 WL 107690 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1998). Foreign broadcasts that reach the
United States have been held insufficient to constitute such use. See Linville v. Rivard, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1731, 1736-37 (1996); Mother's Restaurants, Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc., 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1046, 1047-48 (1983). It is important not to confuse the delivery of digitized goods
with advertising; for example, in a case such as Chuckleberry,the delivery of images was the service.

See supranotes 159, 163-64 and accompanying text.
178. See Person'sCo., 900 F.2d at 1570-71.
179. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at
Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].

180. Id. at 313, 315.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), (b)(1994).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1994).
183. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640-41 (2d Cir. 1956); see also

Person's Co., 900 F.2d at 1568 ("TMrademark rights exist in each country solely according to that
country's statutory scheme.").
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they would accord their own citizens.'4 As such, U.S. courts have consistently held
the Convention territorial in nature: trademark users must perfect their rights nation
by nation, proceeding in any given nation on the same basis as citizens of that
nation would have to proceed.' 5 Thus, use of a mark outside the United States is
not necessarily a sufficient basis to establish priority of usage against a domestic
86
user.1

This may create considerable difficulty for offshore trademark registrants.
Unless the foreign registrant begins using the mark in the United States within a
reasonable period of time, he may be deemed to have abandoned the mark.'87
Additionally, registration without use is of limited utility because in an infringement
action, the foreign registrant is unlikely to be able to show likelihood of confusion
without use ofthe mark in the United States.'88 Yet, the Internet may again change
this dilemma. One effect ofthe Internet's global reach is that foreign registrants may
actually find it easier to prove use in the United States; online use of the mark will
likely translate into use in the United States. 9
Nonetheless, even if the Internet gives foreign registrants claims in the United
States and other nations, registrants must still perfect their trademark in every
country. Conventional businesses that engage in international activity have long
struggled with perfection, and it will be a problem for online businesses as well. In
the past, international activity was largely the provenance of larger firms that were
more likely to command the resources to engage in worldwide, multiple trademark
registrations. The low cost of Internet activity will make electronic commerce
accessible to smaller businesses, that may not have the resources to pursue
trademark registration country by country.
An international registration system would therefore be highly desirable for the

perfection of trademark rights in global electronic commerce. The possibility of a
single international registration process has been raised before and even negotiated
among nations. For example, the Madrid Protocol, an international trademark treaty,
provides for one-stop international registration.' ° Unfortunately, the United States

184. Paris Convention, supranote 179, at 313.
185. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir.
1985). See generally 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPrrIaON § 29.01, at 29-4 to -6 (3rd ed. 1996) (discussing territoriality in priority of trademark
law).
186. See FujiPhoto Film, 754 F.2d at 599; Scholastic, Inc. v. McMillan, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 866,
873 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). See generally 4 McCARTHY, supra note 185, § 29.02, at 29-6 to -7
(discussing domestic priority controls).
187. See Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

188. See id. at 1580.
189. See cases cited supranote 177.
190. See Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration
ofMarks, June 28,1989,8 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
LAW AND TREATIES Text 3-007; Roger E. Schechter, FacilitatingTrademarkRegistrationAbroad:
The Implicationsof U.S. Ratificationof the MadridProtocol,25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &EcoN. 419,
419 (1991).
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has never acceded to the Madrid Protocol.' However, adoption of some
international registration mechanism appears imperative to further the development
of electronic commerce. With such a vehicle already available, utilization of the
Madrid Protocol may be more desirable than attempting to develop a new
mechanism.
4. CyberspaceSovereignty, Again
The market segregation rule that I have outlined faces significant problems in
considering the myriad national sovereigns. Advocates of eyberspace sovereignty
might argue that this failure indicates the need for autonomous Internet governance.
Yet, the argument for such radical reform continues to be unpersuasive. The need
for international harmonization of online trademarks reflects a long-felt need in the
international community for such a system-hence, the existence ofthe previously
mentioned Madrid Agreement. The need for harmonization of online trademark
usage is no different than that for any other international usage: in mail-order sales,
international trade, and so on. This is not to deny that the growth of electronic
commerce may well highlight or amplify the problem. But, because no truly novel
problem presents itself when domestic trademark law is applied to a global
computer network, no truly novel solution is required. What is needed is a degree
of international uniformity for all international usage of trademarks.
The jurisdictional radicals might question whether the uniformity necessary for

online trademark law could be better achieved by designating the Internet as an
independentjurisdiction. Admittedly, this approach has a certain intellectual appeal,

resting as it does on some fascinating philosophical assumptions about human
cognition and the construction of legal paradigms. Internet interaction at times feels
like an interaction in a separate intellectual construct,"9 and people interact online
according to certain rules that lend the appearance of a separate legal construct. 93
Unfortunately, despite its ontological charm, declaring cyberspace to be a
separate jurisdiction appears to be entirely unworkable for a variety of practical
reasons. The most serious objection is that no one lives or works in cyberspace.
Humans live in realspace, and engage in a variety of Internet-related activities that
have effects at other points in realspace. By analogy, it is difficult to conceive of
anyone seriously contemplating declaration of broadcast-space or telephone-space
as separate jurisdictions. The Internet medium differs from these other media in a
variety ofrespects, but not so radically that a declaration ofsui generis jurisdictional
status is required.

191. See 4 MCCARTHY, supranote 185, § 29.10[7], at 29-54.
192. Johnson & Post, supranote 37, at 1378-80; see also MrrCHELL, supra note 92, at 160-61
(comparing cyberspace communities with cities); Alan Wexelblat, GivingMeaningtoPlace:Semantic
Spaces, in CYBERSPACE: FiRsT STEPs 255 (Michael Benedikt ed., 1991).
193. See Johnson & Post, supranote 37, at 1388-89; see also Hardy, supra note 4, at 1033-40
(noting the role of online custom in developing Internet laws).
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Additionally, although the concept of cyberspace as a separate jurisdiction
holds an entrancing philosophical or theoretical appeal, it is simply unworkable as
a practical matter. First, even though borders may be rendered more porous by new
media, the nation-state is by no means defunct as an entity. It seems highly unlikely
that nations would cede any appreciable portion of their sovereignty in the online
world. As Michael Froomkin has pointed out, because people live in realspace
rather than cyberspace, they will continue to be subject to the authority of the
realspace in which one's body, home, and possessions are found. 4 If anything, the
trend of jurisdictional cases in the United States suggests that traditional
governmental entities can and will use195their power over realspace to assert

jurisdiction over Internet-related activity.

This is not to say that present territorially based jurisdictional paradigms remain
unchanged in the face of the Internet's geographic indeterminacy, only that such
change will occur incrementally, via established legal and social institutions. For
example, I have suggested here that the increased international usage of trademarks
in electronic commerce can and should hasten the development and adoption of
multinational trademark treaties such as the Madrid Protocol. Such a result would
perhaps be less dramatic than the designation of cyberspace as a separate
jurisdiction, but in the long run, may be eminently more useful.
V. CONCLUSION

I have argued here that traditional trademark law may be readily adapted to
domestic Internet application, but that international application of trademark law
will require new international cooperation. This position may appear somewhat at
odds with conclusions I have drawn in previous discussions of online intellectual
property protection. 196 I have argued elsewhere that the transborder nature of the
Internet may facilitate interjurisdictional competition and innovation in copyright
incentives. 9 The Internet serves as a conduit for digital goods, allowing consumers
to easily search for such goods outside their immediate area, and thus allows
vendors to relocate wherever local regulation enables them to maximize their
profits. Jurisdictions may experiment with differing copyright regimes in order to
attract businesses and consumers. The interjurisdictional regulatory competition that
may arise may have the beneficial effect of curtailing inefficient protectionist
legislation at the national level; consumers and online businesses may either
194. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internetas a Source ofRegulatory Arbitrage,in BORDERS
IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 33, at 129, 152-54 (discussing the Internet's lack of effect on taxes and
the police power).
195. See, e.g., Inset Sys. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D. Conn. 1996) (basing
jurisdiction on Internet advertising); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D.
Mo. 1996) (basing jurisdiction on web site availability).
196. See, e.g., Burk, supra note 33, at 231 (arguing that an international agreement should be
postponed).
197. See id.
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virtually or physically exit over-regulated regimes. 98 Consequently, I have urged
caution in attempting to regulate or even harmonize copyright at the international
level because there may be considerable value in promoting local variations."
Yet, here I have suggested an entirely different prescription for trademark
law-a movement toward regulation at the international level. This would tend to
suppress or exterminate local experimentation. Why would I not advocate fostering
a degree of international variation, as I have in the case of copyright? The answer
is that, given trademark law's radically different role from that of copyright, the
potential costs and benefits of permitting national experimentation differ
substantially between the two types of intellectual property. A primary function of
trademark law, which is absent from copyright, is to protect consumers from
marketplace confusion or deception; and I have argued that this role will be
heightened in electronic commerce. However, that role is also compromised by
subjecting online consumers to fragmented or inconsistent local rules in every
jurisdiction that the Internet may touch. Thus, international trademark
harmonization yields benefits not part of the copyright calculus.
Additionally, the potential social costs of trademark protection will be less than
those of copyright. Copyright conveys a property right that may severely restrict
public access to a work that could otherwise be made available at a marginal cost
near zero. No similar restriction on use or access to information is likely to happen
in trademark protection, which conveys only an incomplete or quasi-property
interest for a limited purpose." ° Although overly expansive trademark protection
may restrict public access to some popular cultural icons, it is unlikely to facilitate
monopolization of critical blocks of information in the manner of overly expansive
copyright protection.2"' Thus, international agreement on harmonization of
trademark registration and enforcement would appear to be a desirable step to foster
both consumer protection and business in the growth of global electronic
commerce.

198. Id. at 224-25, 228; see also Burk, supra note 124, at 1101-02 (discussing "exit" from
jurisdictions).
199. Burk, supra note 33, at 231.
200. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (referring to
trademarks as limited quasi-property interests).
201. See Landes & Posner, TrademarkLaw, supra note 15, at 276 (stating that "[a] proper
trademark is not a public good"); cf Stephen L. Carter, Owning WhatDoesn't Exist, 13 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 99, 106-07 (1990) (arguing that nationwide trademark protection, unlike copyright
protection, may be too costly because such regulation would be unnecessarily broad).
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